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long with the heightening of
globalization forces, the past two decades
have witnessed the deepening of economic
integration among countries as restrictions on
the free flow of trade and investment are
removed. With rising globalization and
economic integration, competition has also
intensified. In response to these
developments, a new form of industrial
organization has emerged known as
international or regional production networks
(IPNs/RPNs). In IPNs, multinational
corporations (MNCs) fragment their
production processes and locate these in
various countries. These are common in
industries such as auto, machinery,
electronics, and garments, and are characterized
by the exports of parts and components,
capital equipment, and other industrial inputs
for assembly into finished goods.
Production networks are at the heart of
intraregional trade and investment flows in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and East Asia and are the main drivers of
growth in the region. Recognizing this, one of
the main objectives of the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) Blueprint is to deepen and
promote the development of RPNs in order to
increase foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
to ASEAN. The AEC Blueprint aims not only to
create ASEAN as a single market but also for it
to serve as a single production base. Thus, IPN





channel or vehicle through which developing
countries like the Philippines can benefit from
regional trading arrangements and the removal
of barriers to trade and investment flows.
Moreover, IPNs can also provide, apart from
FDIs, access to technology and greater access
to larger markets through exports.
This Policy Notes deals with the impact of the
rising trend of globalization and regional
economic integration on the automotive
industry. It aims to assess the responses of
firms to rising globalization and examine how
the government is managing and facilitating
the transition process of the industry, from
being a highly protected industry to becoming a
more competitive market. Within the context of
this new trade and investment environment, the
following questions will be addressed: How has
the industry fared so far in the face of rising
competition? Are domestic firms able to
integrate with the production networks of their
mother companies? Are there complementary
measures in place to support trade liberalization
under the ASEAN and generate the necessary
supply-side responses (i.e., increase
investments in the industry) that would lead to
growth and increase in employment?
The Notes is divided into five parts. After the
introduction, the next section provides an
overall view of major government policies that
shaped the growth and development of the
industry. Section three examines industry
performance and competitiveness, compares the
country’s costs of production with Thailand, and
identifies the main reasons for the industry’s
weak competitiveness. Section four looks at
how the industry has been responding to
changes in the domestic and international trade
and investment environment while the final
section puts forward some recommendations on
necessary government measures to facilitate the
adjustment process and help the industry
integrate with production networks.
Why an internationally competitive
auto industry for the Philippines
failed to take off
The Philippine automotive industry developed
under heavy government protection,
promotion, and regulation. Through the local
content program, the government tried to
encourage the development of parts and
vehicles by limiting the number of domestic
assemblers to five and requiring them to
source their parts locally through the
imposition of a domestic content requirement.
Starting in the early 1980s, unilateral trade
liberalization was carried out by the Philippine
government by reducing tariffs from 100 percent
to 70 percent in 1981 to 50 percent in 1982. In
1993, this was further lowered to 40 percent
and then to 30 percent in 2000. Within the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), tariffs dropped
to 5 percent in 2003 and have been eliminated
in early 2010. The import ban on new
completely built units (CBUs) was also removed
in 1996 by the government.
In terms of strategy, the Philippine government
did not use domestic taxes as part of its
industrial policy but applied them purely forPN 2011-13
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revenue generation. This is one important
element that differentiates the Philippine policy
from the Thai auto policy. Thailand used excise
taxes strategically to stimulate and encourage
the growth of pick-up trucks which later became
the platform of their niche product, the one-ton
pick-up. Thailand was also the first among the
ASEAN countries to liberalize and was way
ahead of the Philippines in removing the local
content program.
Both the Philippines and Thailand initially
adopted protectionist policies and local
content programs to develop their industries.
Both also later implemented liberalization
policies with the aim of exposing their
domestic firms to more competition and
improving their competitiveness. Still,
however, the auto industries in the two
countries remain highly protected. The case of
the Thai automotive industry, though,
illustrates the important role played by the
government in attracting new investments
and making the reforms and liberalization
work. The timing of its reforms, the coherence
of its auto policy with other domestic
policies, and its strategic product focus were
crucial in the development of the industry and
its emergence as the ASEAN hub of many
international automakers. After 1987, the
industry started to expand rapidly, led by the
rapid growth of the Thai economy and
increased purchasing power of the middle
class, coupled with the surge of FDI inflows
by Japanese firms after the Plaza Accord.
Immediately, the government shifted its
policy toward the liberalization of the auto
industry with the goal of strengthening its
international competitiveness by increasing
competition among local producers.
While Thailand has been characterized by a
favorable environment  with growing domestic
demand and large FDI flows, the Philippines,
on the other hand, lagged in terms of
maintaining a stable macroeconomic and
regulatory environment, increasing domestic
demand, and encouraging FDI.
After almost three decades of import
substitution centered on local content policy,
a large portion of the parts and components
industry in the Philippines still remains
underdeveloped. At best, the local content
program only had a limited impact on the
growth and development of the parts and
components industry. As a result, the linkage
between the automotive assembly sector and
local parts and components has remained
weak. Very little parts and components are
locally sourced with the domestic parts sector,
accounting only for 10 to 15 percent of the
total number of parts and components needed
by local motor vehicle assemblers.
Industry performance
and competitiveness
The total value added contribution of the
assembly industry declined substantially to PHP
19 billion in 2008 from about PHP 72 billion in
2006 (Table 1). This represented a  huge drop in
its  share from 8 percent of total manufacturing
value added in 2006 to 2 percent  in 2008. In
terms of employment contribution, however, itsPN 2011-13
4
Policy Notes
value added, and number of
establishments, with its share to total
manufacturing value added registering an
increase to 1.7 percent and its share of
employment to total manufacturing rising
to 2.6 percent in 2008.
The decline in domestic assembly
operations is also evident in Table 2. The
share of domestically assembled vehicles
sold dropped from 92 percent of total
sales in 2003 to 49 percent in 2009 and
to 44 percent in 2010. The share of CBU
imports rose from 8 percent of total
industry sales in 2003 to 51 percent in 2009.
Given the shrinking scale of domestic
production, completely knocked down (CKD)
operations have become very costly. With the
reduction of tariffs to 5 percent under the AFTA-
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-
CEPT), domestic assemblers have shifted their
Table 1. Total employment and value added contribution of the automotive industry
PSIC Industry Description     Number of Total Employment Value Added (in 000) 
Establishments
 2006  2008    2006   2008      2006       2008
Manufacturing 5,024 4,603 973,178 862,665 868,301,960 816,462,528
Manufacture of motor 5,717 4,938 71,745,691 18,625,312
3410 vehicles 17 14 (0.59%) (0.57%)   (8.3%)   (2.3%)
Manufacture of bodies
(coachwork) for motor
vehicles; manufacture 1,630 1,105 790,410 223,810
3420 of trailers and semi-trailers 16 18 (0.17%) (0.13%)   (0.1%) (0.03%)
Manufacture of parts and
accessories for motor 18,097 22,487 9,597,339 13,828,202
3430 vehicles and their engines 76 84 (1.9%) (2.6%)   (1.1%)   (1.7%)
25,444 28,530 82,133,440 32,677,324
Total 109 116 (2.62%) (3.31%)   (9.5%)      (4%)
Source: National Statistics Office
Table 2. Sales and imports
Year   Sales Production/ New CBU      CBU Imports CKD Sales as %
CKD Sales   Imports as % of Total Sales    of Total Sales
2000 74,000 70,851 3,149 4 96
2001 76,670 65,202 11,468 15 85
2002 85,587 74,734 10,853 13 87
2003 92,336 85,388 6,948 8 92
2004 88,068 58,822 29,246 33 67
2005 97,063 58,566 38,497 40 60
2006 99,541 56,050 43,491 44 56
2007 117,903 61,128 56,775 48 52
2008 124,449 61,513 62,936 51 49
2009 132,444 64,498 67,946 51 49
2010 168,490 74,509 93,981 56 44
Source: Chamber of Automotive Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMPI)
share remained at almost 0.6 percent during the
same years. The manufacture of bodies for
motor vehicles followed the same downward
trend in the assembly sector as it experienced
reduction in employment and value added.
However, the production of parts and
accessories  experienced rising employment,PN 2011-13
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operations away from assembly or CKD
operations toward CBU imports. This is
indicated by the large increase of the latter in
the proportion of imports to total industry
sales from 4 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in
2009 and to 56 percent in 2010.
Currently, there are  six major firms in the
Philippine automotive industry: Toyota,
Mitsubishi, Honda, Isuzu, Nissan, and Ford.
Toyota has consistently been the industry
leader with its share rising from 33.2 percent
in 2004 to 38.2 percent in 2007. However,
this dropped to 36.9 and 34.9 percent,
respectively, in 2008 and 2009. Mitsubishi is
a far second with a 17.6 percent share in
2009, up from 14.4 percent in 2004. Honda is
third with a share of 12 percent in 2002 and
13 percent in 2009. In 2009, Hyundai came in
fourth with its market share of 8.4
percent while Isuzu’s share declined
from 10.5 percent in 2002 to 7 percent
in 2009. Ford follows with a share of
6.2 percent in 2009, down from its 8.3
percent posted in 2002 (Table 3).
Figures 1 and 2 compare the
Philippines’ sales performance with
other ASEAN countries. After the 1997
Asian financial crisis, sales of Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia were all down.
Thereafter, however, they were able to
recover fast from the crisis while the
Philippines has continued to lag behind with its
low sales volume. Note that Vietnam has already
caught up with the Philippines in terms of sales
and production volume.
Table 3. Market shares, 2004–2010
Name of Company 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
Toyota 33.2 36.6 38.4 38.2 36.9 34.9 33.7
Mitsubishi 14.4 13.4 12.6 12.7 14.1 17.6 19.2
Honda 12.0 10.1 13.9 14.7 11.5 13.0 9.9
Isuzu 10.5 9.9 8.2 8.3 8.1 7.0 6.4
Nissan 6.5 5.0 3.3 2.4 2.4 1.8 5.2
Universal 3.8 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.8 3.8
Ford/Mazda 8.3 8.6 6.9 6.3 6.2 6.2 5.8
Hyundai 2.8 5.1 5.5 7.0 8.2 8.4 11.1
Kia 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8
GM/TCCCI 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.1
Suzuki 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0
Hino 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Columbia 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 3.3
M A N 000000
BMW 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5
Volvo 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
PGA 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Commercial 0.1 0.1
Proton, Porsche 0.1
Dreamco 0.1 0 0.1
Daewoo 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: CAMPI
*The remaining companies have a combined share of 4.4 percent.
Figure 1. ASEAN-4 sales of cars, SUVs, MPVs, and LCVs up to 6 tons
Source of basic data: J.D. Power Asia Pacific Forecasting
Competitiveness




First, lack of economies of scale. The industry
requires large economies of scale in order to be
competitive. In the Philippines’ case, domestic
demand has remained weak as its domestic market
is relatively small compared with the other ASEAN
countries. At the same time, the presence of
smuggled vehicles has continued to put
tremendous pressure on the industry; hence,
production volume has remained low.
Figure 3 compares two sets of data: one from
the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the
other from the Chamber of Automotive
Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMPI).
The LTO data refer to newly registered imported
used vehicles while the CAMPI data cover sales
of domestically assembled vehicles and
imported CBUs. As the numbers reveal, there is
a large discrepancy between the two datasets,
with the difference between the two indicating
a rough estimate of the volume of smuggled
vehicles.
Second, limited supply base. The auto parts
industry is composed of 256 suppliers,
with 124 belonging to the first tier. The
first tier includes the major players in
the industry which are mostly
multinational companies supplying parts
to original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) assemblers and are also engaged
in exporting materials. These companies
include, among others, Yazaki-Torres,
Toyota Auto Parts, Honda Parts, Isuzu,
Asian Transmission (Mitsubishi
subsidiary), Temic, Fujitsu (electronic
parts), and Aichi (forged parts).
The remaining 132 firms are tier 2 and 3
suppliers who supply to the first tier.
These are mostly small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) that are confronted
with major problems such as lack of
domestically available materials, low
productivity, and old equipment and
technology. Note, however, that due to
the weak performance of the domestic
assemblers, the total number of parts
and components manufacturers has been
Figure 3.LTO new registration and industry sales of cars, utility
vehicles and sports vehicles
Source: Land Transportation Office (LTO) and CAMPI
Figure 2. ASEAN-4 production of cars, SUVs, MPVs, and LCVs
up to 6 tons
Source of basic data: J.D. Power Asia Pacific ForecastingPN 2011-13
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reduced to 121 companies since 2005. In
Thailand, there are a total of 1,800 suppliers,
700 belonging to tier 1 and the remaining
1,100 are tier 2 and 3 suppliers. Local content
in Thailand is about 80 to 90 percent while in
the Philippines, it is only about 15–20 percent,
a clear indication of the weak linkage of the
industry to the domestic economy.
And third, high cost of production. With low
production volume and limited supply base, the
competitiveness of the auto assembly industry
has remained weak. Production cost in the
Philippines is 1.4 times higher than in Thailand
(Aldaba 2008). If the vehicle is imported as a
CBU from Thailand, including a 5 percent tariff
and logistics cost, the gap is reduced to 1.2.
Based on a study of the auto industry by
Deloitte Consulting, the estimated gap between
the Philippines and Thailand is around US$
1,000–2,000 per vehicle.
Industry response to rising
globalization and regional economic
integration
The auto industry is known to be a highly
global, high-technology industry. It is capital
intensive and requires large economies of
scale. To be competitive, cost, quality,
reliability, and engineering must always be at
par with global competitors. With respect to
demand, consumers always want a variety of
models at reasonable prices.
With rising globalization and economic
integration, the concept of global production
network (GPN) has emerged where to become
more efficient, MNCs are fragmenting their
production process by transferring certain
production processes to developing countries.
Competition has therefore become tougher because
countries must compete not only against their
competitors in the same industry but also
within the same network where they need to
compete against other subsidiaries of their
mother companies located in other countries.
Figure 4 presents an example of Toyota’s GPN,
known as the Toyota Innovative International
Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) Project, where
Toyota upgraded and expanded plants in
Thailand (Toyota Motor Thailand or TMT),
Indonesia (PT Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Indonesia or TMMIN), Argentina, and South
Africa, and turned them into assembly and
export bases for a line of innovative IMVs.
Philippine participation has been limited to
transmission (India’s role as well) while diesel
engine has been assigned to Thailand and gas
engine to Indonesia.
Source: Toyota Motors Corporation
Figure 4. Toyota’s IMV ProjectPN 2011-13
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TMT is regarded as the key base and is expected
to export 140,000 units of pick-up trucks and
SUVs. In 2005, Japan’s first R&D center (Toyota
Technical Center Asia Pacific Thailand Co. Ltd)
in an emerging market was opened in Thailand.
This operates like those in developed countries,
taking platforms and models developed in Japan
to suit the needs of different emerging markets.
Note that historically, Toyota established its
research and development (R&D) centers only in
Japan and developed countries in the US and
Western Europe.
Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda, Isuzu, and Ford are
engaged in domestic assembly operations. Ford
is the only CBU exporter since it has been
assigned the role of passenger car hub of Ford
in the region although its export volume has
remained limited. Currently, there are about 30
models assembled for the domestic market.
Toyota has Vios and Innova while Mitsubishi
has several models, with Adventure, L300, and
Canter as the most popular ones. Honda has
City and Civic. Isuzu also assembles quite a
number of models, the major ones of which are
Crosswind and Dmax. Ford has Escape, Tribute,
Mazda 3, and Focus. Universal has Frontier,
Patrol, and Urvan while Nissan has Sentra, X-
trail, and Grand Livina.
More focused strategic measures
and industrial policy to facilitate
integration of domestic firms with
IPNs
Early this year, auto tariffs were eliminated
within AFTA. One important question that needs
to be asked is: Will the Philippine automotive
industry survive, given its current lack of scale
economies, weak supplier base, and low
competitiveness? As seen in Table 2, the gap
between CBU imports and CKD operations has
been getting smaller since 2004. In 2010,
import share already surpassed the share of
domestically assembled vehicles. The above
concerns are the fundamental issues that must
be addressed in order to strengthen the industry
and integrate it with RPNs of foreign automakers.
In June 2010, Executive Order (EO) 877 or the
Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Development
Plan (MVDP) reiterated the objectives of the
previous plan under EO 156 and enhanced its
industry policy framework by establishing a
Motor Vehicle Industry Council under the
supervision of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). Said council will act as the
central body to coordinate policy for the
development of the motor vehicle industry. To
provide support and improve the
competitiveness of the industry, an Industry
Development Fund would be created for
research and development, acquisition and
upgrading of equipment, human resource
development, and market access support for
exporters. Like the previous plan, the new
MVDP also indicated that tariffs and excise
taxes would be restructured to promote the
development of the industry.
Addressing the smuggling issue is a necessary
condition for the growth of the domestic
assembly sector. At the same time, the
government should carefully plan and manage
the process well in order not to fall into thePN 2011-13
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policy reversal trap. This had happened in the
country’s previous trade liberalization episodes
where without any strategic measures in place,
the government had to resort to either a
postponement or non-implementation of its
own tariff reform schedule. Policy inconsistency
increases uncertainty for doing business. Given
the need to adopt to the changing economic
landscape arising from globalization, the
government needs to formulate more coherent
and well-coordinated policies for the industry. It
must act swiftly to reorient the industry and
help firms adjust to the new economic
environment characterized by more open
markets. Clearly, industrial policy is necessary.
The traditional intervention measures such as
tariffs, however, may not produce the expected
results. For instance, a tariff is the equivalent of
a tax on consumption plus a subsidy to
production. Increasing tariffs would negatively
affect auto imports from non-ASEAN countries
such as Korea, US, and Germany, particularly for
those models that are not manufactured in
regional production bases in Thailand.
Increasing tariffs would also exacerbate the
trade diversion effects of AFTA. With the
elimination of tariffs among ASEAN members,
the tendency would be to buy more from ASEAN
partners and divert trade away from efficient
manufacturers. Increasing tariffs on imports will
exaggerate the cost of imported cars from non-
ASEAN members, resulting in much bigger trade
diversion costs.
One way to counter the trade diversion effect is
to keep the country’s external tariff rates (MFN
or most favored nation) low. The other
alternative is to forge an agreement with
efficient manufacturers like Korea and use this
to facilitate Korean investments in the
Philippines, particularly the location of one of
its ASEAN vehicle models. Currently, the ASEAN-
Korea free trade agreement (FTA) excludes early
auto liberalization since motor vehicles are still
in the sensitive list of ASEAN member countries.
A zero to five percent tariff reduction is
scheduled only in 2016.
Imposing local content requirement or a
discriminatory policy that increases domestic
taxes on imported vehicles is no longer allowed
by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Policy
tools such as local content did not work in the
past; hence, the Philippines should try to avoid
committing the same mistakes by focusing on
the lessons learned.
Globalization and liberalization have become an
irreversible trend. With intense competition,
market participants must always be on their
toes. Given the country’s limited domestic
market, individual brands and models cannot be
produced in large quantities. Firms should
therefore specialize in certain niche products
and markets in which they can best compete.
With the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers
through AFTA, a larger market has been created
that is of sufficient size to allow economies of
scale in production and provide incentives for
investment. Moreover, given the country’s 90
million population, US$20 billion annual
overseas Filipino worker (OFW) remittances,
expanding middle class, and brighter prospectsPN 2011-13
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for sustained and high level of economic
growth, the auto industry’s potentials remain
strong. Though automakers have chosen
Thailand as their production hub, risk
diversification dictates that they will not put all
their investments in only one country.
To take advantage of these opportunities, firms
should continue to rationalize their operations
through greater specialization in the product
niches that they produce. To help firms achieve
this, there is a need for strategic industrial
policy and carefully designed temporary
subsidies that would target improvement of firm
level competitiveness. Any incentive should be
conditioned on firm competitiveness improving
activities such as innovation and research and
development activities, together with human
resource development. The Philippines’
industrial policy should make innovation as its
main focus for providing temporary support to
industries. Fiscal incentives to the industry
should be consolidated and linked with the
promotion of innovation activities. As countries
opened up their economies through the removal
of barriers to trade and investment, competition
has intensified and presented both opportunities
and challenges for domestic firms to innovate
and improve their competitive position. Firms
that survive competition are those that engage
in innovation and R&D activities.
Equally important is the need to strengthen
domestic parts and suppliers, particularly SMEs,
and deepen their linkage with domestic large
enterprises and MNCs. The government needs
measures to establish common support facilities
for SME parts and components suppliers and a
complete package of technical, financial,
marketing, and human resource development for
the auto parts sector. Government support to
SMEs should not be through increased tariff
protection but through the provision of access
to capital and technology which are at the root
of their underdevelopment.
Another crucial policy is the need to
encourage and promote investments in the
industry through joint ventures and
technology agreements with foreign
companies. FTAs with other East Asian
neighbors like Korea and Taiwan could play a
crucial role in facilitating investments and
technical cooperation in the industry. Both
Korea and Taiwan have strong motor vehicle
and parts industries and have their own
production networks in these products. This
could serve as one of the possible areas for
cooperation with Korea and Taiwan. 
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